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Abstract 
The characteristics of a transitional institutional environment are identified and their 
implications for contractual relations are discussed. Empirical results illustrative of the 
peculiarities of the Ukrainian business environment and contractual relations in the 
Ukrainian small business are presented. The interplay between formal and informal 
arrangements in contractual relations is analyzed. The role of different types of trust in 
transaction governance is discussed.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
More than a decade has passed since planned economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe stepped on the path of the transition to the market. Yet, to make the market 
mechanism function successfully, supporting institutions are required. These institutions 
include in D. North's terminology the formal rules of the game and informal constraints, and 
their "..major role in a society is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable...structure to 
human interaction" [1]. The transaction cost approach [2] provides a convenient framework 
for the explanation of the role of institutions: the numerous institutions help to reduce 
transactions costs associated with exchanges between economic agents.  
Under the transition, the old institutional matrix becomes disintegrated, whereas new 
institutions have not been worked through yet, thus transaction costs in emerging market 
economies must be inevitably high.  
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A discontinuous institutional change associated with the transition and subsequent 
frequent incremental adjustments of institutions through the trial-and-error method require 
corresponding adaptations of transaction governance structures. In accordance with the 
transaction cost approach, choosing a certain contracting scheme will be aimed at satisfying 
the condition of transaction cost minimization [2].  
The focus of this paper is on the specificity of contractual relations under the 
transition with the special reference to the Ukrainian transitional economy, particularly on a 
complex tangle of formal and informal arrangements governing transactions in the Ukrainian 
small business.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we discuss the major 
characteristics of a transitional environment, their effect on the transaction cost level and 
implications for contracting. In the third section, we present some empirical results 
illustrative of the peculiarities of the Ukrainian business environment and contractual 
relations in the Ukrainian small business. More specifically, we show how the Ukrainian 
business environment is assessed by entrepreneurs and analyze the role of the formal and 
informal institutions in governing contractual relations. A special emphasis is placed on the 
role of trust and reputation in economic exchanges.  
Empirical part of the analysis is based on the data from a survey of small business 
owners conducted in 1999 in Kharkov, a big industrial city in Eastern 
Ukraine. The sample consisted of 190 entrepreneurs The survey data were collected 
through personal interviewing of respondents using well-structured questionnaires. The 
significance of the observed differences was tested using Z- and t-statistics at two levels of 
significance (α= 0.05 and α= 0.01).  
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2. Institutional Environment and Its Effect on Contracting Modes in a Transition 
Economy 
 
From the institutional point of view, the transition is associated with 0a radical change 
in the formal rules guiding the social life in a society. However establishing a new 
institutional matrix with a harmonic unity of all three dimensions described by D. North [1], 
namely formal rules, informal constraints, and the effectiveness of their enforcement, is at 
best a long term perspective. In the short run, incoherency and instability are the most salient 
attributes of transitional institutions. Under a discontinuous institutional change many 
parameters of the institutional matrix change simultaneously, and it takes time to "bind the 
loose ends together" and make the system run smoothly. 
Thus, the primary role of institutions consisting in reducing uncertainty and providing 
stability of human interactions, thus reducing transaction costs of economic exchanges, 
diminishes during the transition. Insufficient constraints for opportunistic action make 
cooperation riskier and limit realization of potentially beneficial exchanges.  
The specificity of the transitional institutional environment determines the patterns of 
contracting in a transition economy. Ambiguity of laws and regulation procedures, 
inadequate legal support in contract enforcement make economic agents place more emphasis 
on private ordering procedures and other informal ways of solving disputes [3, 4].  
Informality in governing transactions is associated with relational modes of 
contracting. It is more common to evoke the concept of relational contracting when a 
complex long-term transaction with an uncertain outcome is under consideration. However a 
high degree of environmental uncertainty will affect the choice of a contracting mode in the 
way similar to that in which such transaction attributes as complexity and uncertainty do.  
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The very concept of a short- and long-term transaction must differ for relatively stable 
and rapidly changing environments. What can be considered in a more stable environment as 
a short-term transaction, in an environment prone to frequent changes will be a long-term one 
and consequently will require a corresponding contracting scheme. The governance structures 
for short-term transactions in an uncertain environment will resemble in some ways those for 
long-term transactions in a more stable and predictable environment. Environmental 
uncertainty makes writing more complete contracts costlier ceteris paribus and/or increases 
ex ante/ex post negotiation costs. Under these conditions, relational contracting may be more 
appropriate for transaction costs reduction.  
Another aspect of the transitional environment, namely an inadequate third party 
support in contract enforcement might also call for relational rather than classical or 
neoclassical contracting. There is an observation that societies 
involving fewer recurring exchanges between the same parties 
need to rely on formal institutions to promote cooperation, 
and when the probability of continuation is high —i.e., the 
society is predominantly characterized by long-term 
relationships —informal arrangements become viable mechanisms 
especially when contracting costs are also high, which 
diminishes individuals’ willingness to employ contracts 
unnecessarily [1]. The game theoretical predictions and recent experimental 
contributions (see for example [5]) support this idea. Environmental uncertainty, 
characteristic of the transition, narrows horizons of planning and thus diminishes the 
expected number of repetitions of the game which seems to lead to a stronger reliance on 
formal agreements. However, in the absence of an adequate third party support in the contract 
enforcement, the role of informal arrangements can be expected to become more significant.  
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Informality in contractual relations is associated with trust between the parties to the 
transaction. The issue of trust in business relations has moved central-stage in many 
contributions due to the role trust plays in reducing transaction costs. There are also a number 
of macro-level studies, which empirically show the effect of trust on economic performances 
[6, 7].  
Trust is a very elusive concept to define and to analyze due to its multifacetedness. 
However, numerous contributions to studying trust both historical and more recent (see for 
example, [8-14]) lend some insight into the nature of this phenomenon, its types and 
dimensions. Trust can be defined as “..a mutual expectation that partners will not exploit the 
vulnerabilities created by cooperation” [13]. For the present analysis we will contrast two 
different types of trust, which are personal trust and system or institution-based trust. 
Personal trust is likely to develop when individual actors frequently have face-to-face contact 
and become familiar with each other's personal preferences and interests without substantially 
taking recourse to institutional arrangements [8]. On the other hand, "..in the course of time 
multiplicity of institutions has developed whose effect is to reduce the scope for opportunism 
and to foster trust between potential partners" [14]. "..Most trust-creating institutions restrict 
the ability of individuals to break promises, either by compelling them to keep these promises 
or by imposing some penalty if they do not.." [14]. Thus, reducing the risk for trusting 
behavior institutions can enhance trust not in a particular person but rather in a faceless 
potential partner, and this what is referred to as system trust.  
It is clear that when the personal trust is present in contractual relations the exchange 
is personalized. It is equally clear that building such trust relationship is very costly, and only 
after investing a significant amount of time, money, energy into building such relationship 
can one realize the benefits in terms of transaction cost reduction coming from informal 
arrangements. On the contrary, the system trust does not require the personalization of 
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contractual relations, allowing the parties at the same time take advantage of informality in 
business agreements. Under the conditions of a patchy and incoherent institutional 
framework, it is the personal trust that matters more for informal arrangements, which 
determines additional costs of building the relationship. For long-term complex uncertain 
transactions involving a high degree of asset specificity and situations when a number of 
potential partners is limited these costs would be justified. For simple transactions, which do 
not assume much of asset specificity and the number of potential partners is plentiful, costs 
associated with building personal trust must become a real burden, and once the investment 
into the relationship is made, the parties are tied to each other because exit and building a 
new relationship might be associated with additional substantial costs. The implication is 
obvious if it is costly to break the ties and switch to a more efficient partner, the efficiency of 
exchanges might suffer.  
It is also necessary to mention that not only does the transitional institutional matrix 
fail to make a significant contribution into transaction cost reduction but the institutional 
matrix itself due to its instability and ambiguity becomes an additional source of transaction 
costs. High costs of compliance with the regulation may crowd business out to the "shadow". 
Retreating from the realm of formal institutional framework leads to a greater degree of 
informality in contractual relations and, in particular, in contract enforcement. As M. Turvani 
concludes from her analysis of illegal markets “..Prohibition cancels the possibility of 
referring to a higher, more formal level of institutional orders and sanctions..  Transactions 
will take place, but they are now pushed back to another, more primitive institutional 
environment... A black market is a market with a lower degree of institutionalization 
protecting agents and their transactions” [15].  
In some cases the concept of informalization may encompass interactions of economic 
agents with the formal institutional matrix itself in the form of bending of existing formal 
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rules [16]. Detailed discussion of this phenomenon is beyond the scope of this paper, 
however we will present some empirical evidence related to it.  
Thus, under the conditions of a transitional institutional environment incapable of 
providing a sufficient support in contract enforcement, more stress in contractual relations 
between economic agents will be placed on informal arrangements. Frequent changes in the 
institutional environment will raise probability of ex post contract term adjustments and thus 
will call for relational contracting modes even in the case of simple, relatively short-term 
transactions. Informal arrangements and relational contracting schemes are possible when 
based on trust between the parties to the transaction. Under the deficiencies of transitional 
institutions, personal trust must play a greater role.  
 
3. Empirical Evidence from the Survey of Ukrainian Small Businesses 
 
3.1. Institutional environment as assessed by the entrepreneurs 
 
Here we present some empirical results from the survey of the Ukrainian small 
business owners, which portray the Ukrainian business environment as viewed by the 
entrepreneurs.  
The respondents were asked to assess how favorable the Ukrainian business 
environment was for the small business operation in general and for the operation of their 
own enterprises in particular, using a 5-point scale with “1” corresponding to “very 
unfavorable” and “5” to “very favorable”. The mean for “Favorability in general” was 2.1 
and for “Favorability for own enterprise” 2.7 (error did not exceed 6 %). The frequency 
distributions of answers are given in Figure 1 a.  
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As is seen, the business environment was perceived to be more favorable for the own 
enterprise than for the small business operation in general. The observed statistically 
significant difference between the means can be attributed to i) a bias or prejudice against 
existing institutions; ii) a choice of business which is less susceptible to the negative effect of 
the environment, and/or iii) successful adjustment to the hostile institutional environment. 
The latter can mean an informal “correction” of the official rules of the game, e.g. alleviating 
of excessive regulation by establishing personal relations with officials controlling 
entrepreneurial activities.  
The results of the evaluation of the risk for small business functioning in Ukraine in 
general and the risk for own business operation were rather similar to those of environment 
favorability assessment. The “Risk for small business in general” was viewed on average to 
be higher than the “risk for own enterprise” (Figure 1b). Underlying reasons can be similar to 
those discussed above.  
 The results of respondents’ assessment of the importance for them of separate sources 
of risk using 7-point scales are presented in Figure 1c. As is seen, the main sources of risks 
for small business development are related to the institutional factors (taxation policy, 
regulation) and changes in economic situation rather than to market processes – competition, 
fluctuations in demand, etc. Thus, the Ukrainian institutional environment remains the major 
source of risk and impediment for small business operation and development. 
To get further confirmation of the idea of the formal rules “informalization”, the 
respondents were offered the following series of Likert-scale questions:  
1. “To run business successfully, one should establish connections with the regulating 
authorities” 
2. “Entrepreneurs working in the Ukrainian small business often have to violate laws” 
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3. “For Ukrainian entrepreneurs, retreating to the “shadow” is the only way to survive in 
business” 
Taking into consideration a delicate nature of these questions, the respondents were 
asked to express “their opinion regarding small business in general, not necessarily their own 
approaches to running business”. 
Measured on 7-point Likert scales with 1 as “fully agree”, 7 as “completely disagree”, 
and 4 as a neutral point, the means were 2.2, 2.3 and 2.9 for questions 1, 2 and 3 respectively, 
which indicates rather high degree of agreement with the statements. The frequency 
distributions of the answers are given in Figures 2 a,b,c.  
Establishing personal links with the regulatory authorities can be considered as an 
attempt to acquire some degree of control over activities of these agencies, and thus to make 
an immediate institutional environment less hostile.  
The Ukrainian business environment can not be described as supportive not only 
because of regulation but also due to unsatisfactory business infrastructure (financial, 
informational, legal). According to our results, 74 % of the respondents use no external 
financing at all. The rest have to resort mainly to so-called non-market financial institutions 
[17] - around two thirds of credits come from informal sources (Figure 8). Lending by official 
financial institutions such as banks is not popular under the conditions of a high uncertainty 
about the future developments and with poor possibilities of monitoring and tracking 
borrowers’ credit histories. Higher risks lead to higher interest rates, which are not affordable 
for many small business owners. So, the majority of those using external financing receive it 
within a circle of familiar people. The system is though workable but obviously inferior to 
that related to official or “market” financial institutions as having a very low potential for 
promoting economic growth. 
Availability and adequacy of the legal support will be discussed in the next section.  
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The low quality of the institutional environment has implications for governance 
structures of transactions taking place in that environment. Although we do not establish 
explicit (quantitative) links between the environmental factors and characteristics of the 
governance structures, qualitatively the implications seem rather obvious and are commented 
on in the discussion that follows.  
 
 
3.2. Contractual relations in the Ukrainian small business: interplay between formal 
and informal institutions  
In this section we will empirically explore patterns of contractual behavior in the 
Ukrainian small business that help to minimize transaction costs within the given institutional 
environment.  
 
3.2.1. Choice of business partners, informal networks and personalization of exchanges 
In section 2, it was already mentioned that when an institutional framework fails to 
provide an adequate support for economic exchanges, economic agents will more actively 
have a recourse to relational contracting modes even in the case of simple, short-term 
transactions. Relational contracting implies personalization of economic exchanges.  
The survey results show that the identity of business partners in the Ukrainian small 
business does matter. On average more than 50 % of overall business contacts of the 
respondents were established with people they knew personally; over 30 % of contacts were 
established with people known by recommendation and less than 20 % of business relations 
were started with earlier unknown people. Approximately 17% of respondents never deal in 
business with unfamiliar people.  
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Informal networks play an important role in the Ukrainian small business. They allow 
entrepreneurs to reduce transaction costs due to better possibilities of monitoring and help to 
partially lift the informational problem when locating trading partners. According to the 
respondents, informal networks represent main source of information on reputation of 
potential business partners leaving mass-media, research agencies and other official sources 
of information well behind from the point of view of both frequency of their using and their 
reliability.  
The advantage of dealing with familiar people consists in the fact that investments in 
the information about a potential business partner’s personality has been already made 
(sometimes long before the contractual relationship starts), and there is no need to incur 
additional transaction costs. The same reasoning can be employed to explain a certain rigidity 
in the process of switching from a well-known partner to a new one. The less information 
about potential partners is available and the less effective the institutional support in contract 
enforcement is, the more rigidity will be associated with choosing/changing business 
partners.  
In the Ukrainian business, partners are usually heavily invest in personalizing 
relations. The respondents from the survey were asked about how important for them to 
establish informal relations with the business partner and to win his/her benevolent attitude. 
The frequency distribution of their answers is shown in Figure 3 together with another 
distribution reflecting how often they undertake steps to establish such relations. As is seen 
from the distributions, entrepreneurs consider building personal relations with business 
counterparts rather important. The reasons underlying the attempts to personalize exchanges 
are different. Equally important (at least the differences were statistically insignificant) were 
the following reasons: “to secure higher responsibility of the business partner”, “to increase 
predictability of the partner’s behavior”, “to get better idea about the partner’s personal 
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qualities”. “Making interaction more pleasant” was considered less important (the difference 
was statistically significant).  
Another interesting result of the survey, which further underscores the importance of 
the identity in business relations, is related to the reputation of potential partners. The 
respondents were asked to estimate importance for them of personal reputations of 
prospective business partners and reputations of their firms as legal entities using a 5-point 
scale with 1 as “extremely important” and 5 as “unimportant”. The results showed that 
personal reputations matter more than those of legal entities: 1.8 vs. 2.2, with the difference 
statistically significant. This shows that exchanges in small business are highly personalized. 
When a business agreement is not adequately supported by formal institutions, sticking to the 
agreement terms greatly depends on personal characteristics of the parties.  
Another reason for relying more on the personal reputation can be connected with 
short life-cycles of firms working in an unstable and hostile business environment. Firms 
appear and disappear but people remain, that is why the personal reputation is a more 
meaningful indicator and basis for starting business relations. However, the two types of 
reputation are closely related.  
 
3.2.2. Breach of contract terms: reasons, responses, safeguards 
The situation in the Ukrainian economy is often referred to as a “crisis of contractual 
relations”, which manifests itself through different types of contract terms violations. This 
problem is also relevant for small business.  
In our survey, we attempted to reveal reasons for the violation of contract terms and to 
rate them according to their frequency (Figure 4 a). The most frequent reason is 
“circumstances beyond the business partner’s control”. Unforeseen contingencies resulting 
from changes in an unstable environment are the main causes of contract term violations. 
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However, if changes in business environment are frequent and affect the performances of 
parties to transactions, there can arise temptation to benefit from violating contract terms 
under the pretext of unfavorable external circumstances without a damage for reputation. And 
here, the above discussed informal networks and personal relations may prove helpful in 
providing closer monitoring.  
The rest of the reasons are related to the business partner’s characteristics. 
Irresponsibility of the business partner was rated as the second most frequent reason of 
contract term violations. The fact that this reason is cited so frequently means that the 
incentives for more responsible behavior are sufficient. A possible explanation is the lack of 
competition, especially when choice of business partners is confined to a small network. 
To reduce the risk of contract term violations, entrepreneurs use the following 
safeguards. The most popular is prepayment. It is followed by “dealing with familiar people”, 
“careful writing of the contract” and “gathering maximum information about personality and 
capabilities of the business partner”. The latter three measures are almost equally popular 
though related to rather different approaches to building business relations. Dealing with 
familiar people implies possibility of a higher degree of informality in business relations 
while careful writing the contract assumes building these relations on more formal basis.  
The informal mechanism of contract enforcement is more typical for informal networks 
where the information on reputation is easily available and community enforcement plays an 
important role. However, contractual relations are not reduced to informal agreements but 
rather represent a mixture of formal and informal arrangements.  
 
3.2.3. Complementarity of formal and informal arrangements in contractual relations  
It is known that opportunism can be reduced by contract law, obligations of an ethical 
or trusting nature, or reputation [18]. These mechanisms of protection from opportunism are 
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not incompatible, on the contrary "formal arrangements such as written contracts are 
employed jointly with informal dealings to support diverse types of exchanges.." [5].  
Probabilistic hold-up framework, proposed by Klein, "implies a fundamental 
complementarity between court enforcement and private enforcement" [19]. The necessity of 
combining formal and informal means of contract enforcement stems from the fact that 
"..private enforcement capital is limited.." and ".. transactors can be expected to use written 
contract terms and, hence, the assistance of the court, as a supplement to private 
enforcement"..[19].  
Our results also support the view that there is a sophisticated tangle of formal and 
informal arrangements in business agreements. The mix of arrangements must depend on the 
characteristics of the institutional environment in which the transaction is carried out and also 
must be idiosyncratic to the particular relationship between the contracting parties.  
As is seen from Figure 4 b, the most popular measure used for settling disputes arising 
from contract term violation is re-negotiation of the contract terms. It appears rather sensible 
if the main cause of violations is circumstances outside business partners’ control. Litigation, 
as a means of contract enforcement, was considered by the respondents as the least popular 
measure. These results are consonant with those reported in [3].  
Thus, private ordering is more typical for governing transactions in the Ukrainian 
small business than appealing to courts. The system of legal support was evaluated by the 
respondents rather critically (Figure 5 a). Only 20 % of respondents had had pervious 
experience in enforcing contracts through courts. At the same time, and this is an interesting 
observation, their opinion on the effectiveness of the legal support was on average higher 
than that of the rest of the sample.  
It should be noted, however, that though a great number of respondents valued 
existing legal support as rather ineffective, they showed a very moderate interest in its 
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improvement (Figure 5 b), which might be an evidence of their relying more on other means 
of business agreement enforcement.  
To find out to what extent the respondents relied upon formal and informal agreements in 
their business relations, we asked them to divide 100 % between formally written documents, 
which could be used in the court for contract enforcement and informal verbal agreements 
backed up by the partner’s reputation and other means of contract enforcement. The relative 
importance of formal and informal agreements was different for different respondents 
varying from the reliance exclusively on formal agreements to the absolute preference of 
informal ones. However, on average the respondents claimed to rely more on formally 
written documents than on informal agreements in the proportion  56 %: 44 %, the error of 
determination not exceeding 8 %. This result seems somewhat surprising because according 
to the survey data, the percentage of respondents who had an experience with litigation is 
very low despite the frequent contract term violations. Besides, the respondents did not 
exhibit much interest in improving the legal support system. It might mean that the need for 
the improvement of the legal assistance in contract enforcement is a better proxy for judging 
about how much stress is put on formal and informal agreements. On the other hand, it might 
be a further evidence that formal and informal arrangements are complementary to each 
other. Anyway, the interplay of formal and informal arrangements is not simple and 
straightforward one.  
Besides, as  B. Klein asserts ".. when contracts are not costly, individuals may be 
tempted to use these instruments even when informal agreements alone are self-enforcing.." 
[19]. That is exactly our case. Formal agreements governing simple transactions, which are 
prevalent in small business, are not costly. They are incomplete anyway, but the subject of 
transaction and its result are clear and certain.  
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Finally, although the respondents did not show much confidence in litigation, they 
might believe that for a partner prone to opportunistic behavior it represents a credible threat. 
If not the punishment itself in the form of full compensation of the other party's losses, at 
least the engagement in time-consuming legal procedures and possible costs of affecting 
impartiality of the third party, may deter opportunistic behavior.  
 
3.2.4 Trust as the basis for cooperation: does integrity interfere with competence? 
 As trust is a multifaceted phenomenon, there are different typologies of trust. In 
Section 2, we discussed the difference between personal trust and system trust [8, 12].  
It is personal trust that plays a greater role in the Ukrainian small business. In a view 
of frequent contract term adaptations, informal adjustments of contact terms would help to 
minimize both ex ante and ex post transaction costs. Besides, the deficiencies of institutional 
support in contract enforcement will call for private ordering where the identity of the 
partners will matter. As was shown above, Ukrainian entrepreneurs place more emphasis on 
personal reputations of business partners than on reputations of legal entities and prefer to 
carry out transactions with familiar people. Although such approach is justified at the micro-
level from the point of view of transactions costs minimization, it certainly imposes 
limitations on overall economic development. As N.Luhmann notes “..the lack of confidence 
will lead to feelings of alienation, and eventually to retreat into smaller worlds of purely local 
importance..”[20].  
The problem with personal trust is that “..it takes tremendous amounts of time and 
effort to establish it and thus can not be deemed a very efficient way of coordinating 
economic transactions within complex socio-economic systems... Today trust based on 
individual actors' integrity can only fulfil a supplementary function, compared with trust 
produced by institutional arrangements..” [12]. 
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To further elaborate on the issue of trust in business relations, we will look at it from a 
different perspective. As R. Rowthorn notices, "..if we hire someone, take job or collaborate 
in a business venture, we are interested in the abilities and intentions of the other parties. 
Intentions alone are not sufficient, since our partners may be willing and honest, but mistaken 
about their abilities.."[14]. Drawing on the ideas from [13, 14], for the purposes of our 
analysis we will distinguish between trust in the intentions and trust in the competence of a 
business partner. 
In accordance with the above presented rating, the third most frequent cause of 
contract terms violation is insufficient qualification and incompetence of the business partner. 
The reported frequency of intentional violation of contract terms is low in comparison with 
other causes, which can be due to a careful choice of business partners within the informal 
network. To all appearances, personal honesty comes before professional qualifications. In 
other words, it is trust in intentions of the potential business partner that plays more 
significant role in business relations in the Ukrainian small business, while the lack of 
competence is tolerated more readily. Clearly, such an approach limits the competition and 
inhibits growth in business performances. 
Contrary to that, in economically developed societies, a greater stress is put on 
professional qualifications and performances of business partners, which, in turn, is 
determined by a wider choice of business partners (not only within small informal networks) 
and, consequently, higher competition; more reliable sources of information on potential 
business partner’s reputation. Stable environment and effective institutions limit possibilities 
for opportunism. 
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Conclusions 
To summarize, the empirical study of contracting under the transition was aimed at 
showing the peculiarities of contractual relations in the Ukrainian transitional institutional 
environment, whose incoherency and instability increase costs of transacting and affect 
contracting modes that parties to transactions choose.  
It is shown that business relations are built and maintained within informal networks, 
which helps to reduce transaction costs under the given constraints. However, the 
confinement to informal networks narrows choice of potential business partners and limits 
competition and incentives for improving business performances. Therefore, it is honesty of 
potential business partners that is better secured within informal networks than the partners 
competence.  
Frequent changes in business environment, which account to a great extent for a high 
rate of contract term violations, necessitate frequent adjustments of business agreement terms 
and that is why require relational contracting schemes even for simple short-period 
transactions. Private ordering is normally preferred to legal procedures. It is flexible 
relational contracting schemes that allow transacting parties to keep transaction costs at 
minimum. 
It is also shown that personal trust plays a much more significant role in business 
relations than system trust. However, the latter is a necessary condition for a successful 
economic development and growth.  
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Figure 1 
"To run business successfully, one should have 
connections with the regulating authorities"   (a)
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"Entrepreneurs working in the Ukrainian small business 
often have to violate laws"  (b)
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"For Ukrainian entreprenuers, retreating to "shadow" 
is the only way to survive in business"  (c)
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Figure 2 
Perception of importance of establishing informal relations with business 
partners
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Figure 3 
Reasons for contract term violations (a)
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Ways of settling conflicts connected with contract 
term violation  (b)
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Figure 4 
  
 
 
 
 
Effectiveness of contract enforcement by legal 
procedures     (a)
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Need for more effective legal support
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
great need rather strong
need
some need little need no need at all
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 
 
